device, which enables a vehicle to not only com municate with other vehicles on the road using vehicletovehicle (V2V) communications, but also to roadside unit (RSU) devices-that is, vehicle toRSU (V2R) communications. When RSUs serve as the gateways, vehicles can also access to the remote servers, such as a traffi cmonitoring server, on the road. Because of its hybrid architecture, Vanet can provide safety and entertainment related applications on the road. 1 Vehicular traffi c monitoring (VTM) is an important application of Vanet, 2 where vehicles moving on the road can use V2V and V2R communications to report the traffi c congestion, accidents, and roadsurface conditions to the traffi cmonitoring server and other vehicles (see Figure 1) . With a VTM system, drivers can avoid traffi c jams and take lesscongested roads, and the government can take effective action to control traffi c and quickly detect roadsurface problems.
Although VTM is a promising cyberphysical system, it faces many security and privacy preservation challenges, especially for location privacy. If the vehicles' location privacy can't be preserved, drivers won't participate in the VTM system. To encourage drivers' participation, the VTM should employ extensive and trusted privacy preservation techniques that protect vehicles' identity and location privacy. However, because a malicious vehicle can't be tracked using a complete privacy preservation technique, 3 then most users would expect to have a conditional privacypreservation technique to secure VTM systems, where a trusted authority (TA) has the ability to track a malicious vehicle's real identity. Group signatures can build conditional privacy preservation; however, the computation costs are relatively high. 3, 4 Unlinkable pseudoID techniques can also build conditional privacy preservation, but the revocation list will get very long when revoking a malicious vehicle. 5 Although an effi cient certifi caterevocation mech anism is proposed, 6 it doesn't support forward unlinkability. Forward unlinkability is actually an important requirement in VTM systems-if a vehicle is compromised and becomes malicious, the compromised vehicle defi nitely should be revoked; yet the vehicle's past messages and locations (from before the time when it was compromised) should still be protected and unlinkable.
In this article, to address these challenges, we introduce a lightweight conditional privacy preservation (LCPP) protocol, which uses simple hashchain techniques to not only support real identity tracking by a TA, but also to achieve effi cient local revocation verifi cation on the road. This would include the requirements of location privacy, conditional privacy preservation, and forward unlinkability in secure VTS systems.
LCPP
Here, we propose our effi cient LCPP protocol for securing VTM systems, which is comprised of two 
System Settings
We consider a secure VTM system, which includes a set of vehicles V = {V 1 , V 2 , …} moving on the road, a set of RSUs deployed roadside, and a TA. The TA is a highly trusted entity, whose duties include initializing the whole system, assigning key materials to vehicles, and helping track and revoke malicious vehicles. RSUs are connected with the TA through some reliable wired/wireless communica tions, and the functions of RSUs include relaying the messages ex changed between vehicles and the TA and disseminating the revocation list (RList) to passing vehicles. Each vehicle V j ∈ V is moving on the road, periodically reporting the road con ditions, traffic congestions, and acci dents through V2V and V2R commu nications. To establish a secure VTM system, the TA first sets up the system parameters as follows: given a secu rity parameter k, the TA generates the bilinear parameters (q, P, G, G T , e), where q is a kbit prime number, G, G T are two groups with order q, P ∈ G is a generator, and e G G G T : × → is a nondegenerated and efficiently com putable bilinear map. 7 Then the TA chooses two random numbers k, s Z* ∈ q as the master key, and computes P pub = sP. In addition, the TA selects a secure symmetric encryption algo rithm Enc-for example, the Ad vanced Encryption Standard (AES)-and three cryptographic hash functions
the TA keeps the master key secretly, and publishes the public parameters (G, G T , q, e, P, P pub , H 0 , H 1 , H, Enc).
To achieve the conditional privacy preservation for the vehicles on the road, the TA first divides a long time range into some small, continuous time periods V 1 , V 2 , … T n , and then assigns a large number of pseudoIDs to each vehicle V j ∈ V (see Figure 2) . Concretely, for each vehicle V j ∈ V, the TA first chooses a random number 
Conditional Tracking
Within the secure VTM system, once a message M signed by PID x ji is in dispute, the real identity V j of the message source should be tracked and disclosed by the TA, and if V j has been revoked before, other vehicles on the road can perform the local revocation verification on PID x ji .
Tracking real identity by the TA. Once the TA receives a disputed message M, together with its signature with respect to the pseudoID
, the TA first parses and extracts Enc k (V j || R jix1 ), and uses the master key k to recover V j || R jix1 . In such a way, the TA can track and disclose the real identity V j . To support local revocation verification on the road, the TA first uses the identity V j to search the TList to retrieve the entry (V j , R j ), then computes the key material k i j at time period T i from the retrieved R j -that 
Privacy-Preservation Verification
In the following, we verify the privacy preservation of LCPP in terms of location privacy, conditional privacy preservation, and forward unlinkability.
Location Privacy
To achieve location privacy in the VTM system, each vehicle V j ∈ V should hold a large number of unlinkable pseudoIDs. In LCPP, any pseudoID
is cal culated from two random numbers R jix1 , R jix2 . Because of the randomness, all pseudoIDs of V j are unlinkable. As a result, location privacy can be preserved only if V j changes its pseudoIDs at the proper time and occasion. 9
Conditional Privacy Preservation
To achieve conditional privacy pres ervation, no other vehicles except a TA should be able to identify the real identity V j from any pseudoID 
